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Abstract—We present a novel program logic, Lf , which is
designed on top of a Hoare logic, but is simpler, more flexible
and more scalable. Based on Lf , we develop a framework
for automatically verifying safety properties of executables. It
utilizes a whole-program interprocedural abstract interpretation
to automatically discover the specifications needed by Lf to prove
a program judgment. We implemented Lf and the framework in
the HOL theorem prover.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is challenging to formally reason about executable code,
because it lacks high-level abstractions such as types, data
structures and structured control flow. Some research has
addressed various issues in formally verifying machine code or
low-level code [2], [14], [15], [17], [20], [22], [24]. However,
it is still impractical or very inefficient to verify some critical
safety properties about executables emitted by a production
compiler such as GCC using theorem proving.
We present a novel program logic framework for automat-
ically proving safety properties about real-world executables.
Its theoretical foundation is a new program logic, Lf , designed
on top of a Hoare logic. A Hoare logic describes code with a
triplet judgment: {p} c {q}, where p and q are the pre- and
post-conditions of code c, specifying the states before and after
the execution of the code, respectively [7], [10]. The reasoning
process is to compose the judgment of a piece of code from
judgments of smaller codes using inference rules, until the
judgment of an entire program is achieved.
It is simple to compose judgments of sequential code with
a sequencing rule [7]. However, it is difficult to handle un-
structured control flows, because for each type of control flow
transfers, it requires proving some inference rules and using
them interactively [13]. For example, in order to specify a
loop, it requires a loop rule and a termination proof; this is not
acceptable for reasoning about embedded code where control
loops are often infinite. In addition, the goal of composing a
monolithic judgment for an entire program has not been shown
useful in practice, because it is not scalable.
Our idea is keeping the simple part of a Hoare logic: com-
position of code blocks, which only have sequential control
flows, such as a basic block or a super block; beyond code
blocks, we design a novel scalable logic structure which does
not require compositional rules and which makes it possible
to automate the entire proof of safety properties. This resulted
in Lf (a logic with hierarchical function judgments).
The structure of Lf has three layers. The bottom layer is
instruction semantics. In principle, any sound formal semantics
works, and there exists independently developed, well-vetted,
realistic formal semantics for common instruction set architec-
tures, such as ARM [4], [5] and x86 [18]. The middle layer is
Hoare judgments of code blocks. We implement this layer by
a Hoare logic that has compositional rules for code blocks.
The top layer, as the core of Lf , is hierarchical function
judgments. A function is roughly equivalent to a function
constructed by a binary rewriting/analysis tool. Such tool can
decompile an executable, construct a conservative control flow
graph, and build functions by using call/return conventions,
besides other functionalities [11], [23]. A function has code
blocks and calls to other functions. We abstract the calls
by well-formed nodes, which also have a precondition and
a postcondition: the precondition is the initial condition of
a callee, and the postcondition is the condition that holds
when the callee returns. We define the relationship among the
Hoare judgments of the code blocks and the callee nodes:
for each node, the postconditions of its predecessors imply its
precondition. The final judgment of a program is the judgment
of the top-level or entry function.
The hierarchical function judgments have several advan-
tages over a traditional Hoare logic. First, it does not compose
over code blocks, so it does not need rules for loops or any
arbitrary jumps. Nor a termination proof. The definition of
the function judgment handles both infinite and finite loops.
Second, it naturally divides an executable into object-code
functions, and the reasoning process examines one function
at a time. As a result, it easily scales to an entire program.
Third, it facilitates proof automation in two ways. One is the
composition of judgments of code blocks, whose sequential
structure is simple enough that we automate the composition
by meta-language programming. The other is utilizing inter-
procedural abstract interpretations to automatically discover
the relationship among Hoare judgments in verifying shallow
safety properties.
The first two layers of Lf have been well studied in
literature, and in this paper, we focus on the hierarchical
function judgments (Section II) and an application of Lf :
automatic verification of safety properties with assistance of
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<entryFun>
blk1: (0x0, 0xE3A0D441) //mov r13,#0x41000000
(0x4, 0xE3A00000) //mov r0,#0
(0x8, 0xE1A01000) //mov r1,r0
(0xC, 0xEB000000) //bl foo (branch to foo)
blk2: (0x10,0xEAFFFFFE) //b +#0 (branch to blk2)
<foo>
blk3: (0x14,0xE2411001) //sub r1,r1,#0x1
(0x18,0xE3320101) //teq r2,#0x40000000
(0x1C,0x11A0F00E) //movne pc,r14 (ret neq)
blk4: (0x20,0xE5C21000) //strb r1,[r2] (str byte)
(0x24,0xE3310000) //teq r1,#0x0 (test eq)
(0x28,0x1AFFFFF9) //bne foo (branch neq)










(b) Program CFG (c) Abstracted function nodes
Fig. 1. An example
A. An Example
To explain Lf and to show how it works, we take the exam-
ple of proving memory safety: store operations are confined to
pre-defined regions, and control flow integrity: execution may
not escape a pre-determined control flow graph (CFG), about
the ARM executable shown in Figure 1.
For memory safety, we want to prove that it only writes
to a memory section mem = {a|0x40000000 ≤ a ∧ a <
0x41000100}. For control flow integrity, we need a CFG
policy (Figure 1.b). The CFG policy of an executable may be
computed by a binary analysis tool, or by hand. How the CFG
policy is computed is irrelevant to Lf ; what is critical is that
Lf verifies that the executable respects the given CFG policy.
We model the CFG policy by a function succ: given an
address of an instruction, it returns the set of addresses where
the control goes. Suppose the given CFG policy of the example
is (computed by hand): succ i = {0xC → {0x14}, 0x10 →
{0x10}, 0x1C → {0x20, 0x10}, 0x28 → {0x14, 0x2C}, 0x2C →
{0x10}, i → {i + 0x4}}, where → means a parameter-return
value pair. For brevity, we use i → {i + 0x4} to denote the
PC relation inside a basic block without explicitly listing them
(it is only used after other lookup fails).1
For this program, Lf establishes that the strb instruction in
blk4 does not violate the memory safety, and the two indirect
jumps at 0x1C and 0x2C follow the given CFG policy. We
1If the given CFG policy is too small, or does not coincide with the
executable, a proof attempt will fail.
first compose the Hoare judgments of code blocks, and the
results show what conditions are required in order for a block
to execute safely. For example, blk4’s precondition requires
{r2} ⊆ mem, and blk5 requires r14 ∈ succ(0x2C) (similar
to blk3). Next, we reason about the relationship among the
Hoare judgments of block 3, 4 and 5 (of function foo). We
follow and verify the CFG of the function and derive the fact
that the postcondition of blk3 (from 0x1C to 0x20) satisfies
that register R2 has value 0x40000000, which discharges the
condition of blk4. However, the two assertions of the control
flow integrity of blk3 and blk5 can not be discharged inside
foo, and they are propagated to the precondition of foo
by an abstract interpretation. We next abstract the function
into a Hoare judgment, which can be fed into its caller,
entryFun, and which behaves like the judgments of blk1
and blk2 (Figure 1.c). We reason about the relationship among
the three Hoare judgments of entryFun: of blk1, of blk2,
and of the abstracted foo, and we are able to discharge the
two assertions of foo. The final result is a program judgment:
PROG_SPEC SAFE_INS entryFun 0x0 pred bspec
Informally, it means that the program holds its memory safety
and control flow integrity with respect to a given specifica-
tion. We will discuss in detail how we formally reach this
conclusion (Section IV).
It is worth to point out that verifying memory safety is
not always possible in real-world executables, because telling
that every store operation is confined to pre-defined regions
is undecidable in general. In order to make proof possi-
ble in practice, we insert necessary dynamic checks before
dangerous stores whose addresses can not be determined
statically, and this instrumentation is done by transforming
an executable with a binary rewriter. We also get the CFG
policy of the rewritten executable from the rewriter. These
practical considerations affect if a proof attempt succeeds. For
instance, if there was not blk3 in Figure 1.a, our proof of
the memory safety would simply fail (in fact, any kind of
verification attempt would fail), and we could not derive the
above program judgment. However, they are not irrelevant to
how Lf works, and we have omitted them.2
We implemented Lf and the framework for verifying safety
properties in the HOL theorem prover [8]; we automatically
proved the memory safety and control flow integrity of rewrit-
ten ARM executables, including some MiBench programs [9].
II. Lf
We design the first layer of Lf to utilize an existing formal
ARM semantics, and it comes in as proven Hoare triples in the
HOL theorem prover [5], [13]. Figure 2 shows the semantics
for a store instruction: strb r1, [r2]. It says that after execution
of the instruction, the value at memory address r2 is updated
to the least significant byte of r1 (w2w converts a 32-bit word
into an 8-bit word), and the program counter (PC) increased
2Determining which stores are dangerous and inserting dynamic checks for
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{PC p ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1 ∗ MEMORY dom f ∗ 〈r2 ∈ dom〉}
(p,0xE5C21000) // strb r1,[r2]
{PC (p+ 4) ∗ R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1∗
MEMORY dom ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) f)}
Fig. 2. Axiomatic semantics of strb r1, [r2]
by 4. From our perspective, those theorems are equivalent to
instruction axioms in an axiomatic semantics, since we take
those theorems as granted and build our logic on top of it. This
semantics has some important properties which we summarize
below. For a full treatment, interested readers may refer to the
references mentioned above.
• Machine states include registers, memory cells, status
flags, and the current program status register. For exam-
ple, PC p in the precondition of Figure 2 asserts that
the program counter has value p and that p is word-
aligned; R 2 r2 and R 1 r1 assert that registers R2 and
R1 have values r2 and r1, respectively; MEMORY dom f
asserts that some set of memory addresses dom has
value f (these are symbolic values). The 7→ operator
in the meta logic updates a function on a given value
while keeping other values unchanged, whose definition
is: a 7→ b = λf c. (if a = c then b else f c). Other
machine state assertions include S t v: one of the status
flags t (carry sC, negative sN, overflow sV, or zero sZ)
has value v.
• The ∗ operator is a version of separating conjunction
which has important properties as in the separation
logic [19]: (1) a triple only asserts the change of a local
state (the parts of state that are used by the instruction),
and a global version may be achieved by using the Frame
rule; (2) if a separating conjunction expression asserts
a machine resource more than once (excluding a pure
assertion), then its value is false.
• 〈〉 represents a pure assertion [19], i.e., it does not assert
any machine resource but serves as a predicate to specify
the boolean relationship between variables. 〈r2 ∈ dom〉
says that r2 has to be in the domain of the memory
function f in order for this transition to take place.
• The pair, (p,0xE5C21000), represents code assertion
for the instruction, meaning that the value 0xE5C21000
is stored at the memory address of p.
• Some boolean operators such as implication (⇒) and
disjunction (∨) are lifted to the separating conjunction
level. For example, p ∗=⇒ q means λs. (p s⇒ q s); p ⊻ q
is λs. (p s ∨ q s).
A. Label Predicates
The assertion language in Lf is a set of label predicates.
A label predicate is a pair of a label (instruction address)
and a predicate, interpreted as that the predicate holds at the
associated label. A set of label predicates means that there is
a true label predicate in the set. Formally, the syntax of a label
predicate is
lp ∈ LabelPred = LabelExp× StatePred
l ∈ LabelExp = word32
p ∈ StatePred = separating conjunction expression
Its interpretation is defined by a semantic functions LP2SP,
and another function, LPSET, interprets a set of label predi-
cates:
LP2SP (l, p) = PC l ∗ p
LPSET P = λs. (∃lp. lp ∈ P ∧ (LP2SP lp) s)




=⇒ Q iff (LPSET P ) ∗=⇒ (LPSET Q)
We define the following rule in order to use the existing
semantics in Lf , and it converts an instruction axiom to
another theorem that uses the syntax of label predicates. The
reason for the conversion is that it is easy for the meta logic to
operate on a pair, but it is difficult to operate on the ∗ operator.
Another advantage of label predicates will become clear when
we define the function judgment later.
{PC l ∗ p} ins {PC l′ ∗ q}
ORG_INS (l, p) ins (l′, q)
Ins
B. A Hoare Logic
The middle layer of Lf is a multi-entry multi-exit Hoarejudgment with a set of label predicates as its assertion lan-
guage. We use a step relation to bridge state transitions in
Lf and the existing axiomatic semantics.
step ir i s t iff ∃p q. (ir p i q) ∧ (LP2SP p) s ∧ (LP2SP q) t
where ir is a parameterized relation of instruction transition,
namely, an instruction semantics. It can be the existing instruc-
tion semantics introduced above (ORG_INS), or an augmented
version for proving safety properties (to be described later). It
says that a transition from state s to state t by instruction i
under a given semantics is equivalent to a transition from s to
t made by the instruction under the semantics.
Based on the step relation, we implemented a Hoare logic.
Because Hoare logic has been well studied in literature, we
have omitted its details. We summarize the important results
below. Interested readers may refer to [6], [14] for detailed
discussions.
• We write a Hoare judgment as SPEC ir {P} C {Q},
where ir is the semantic parameter discussed above, P
and Q are sets of label predicates, and C is a set of
labeled instructions. Its interpretation is that if there exists
a true label predicate in the precondition, then there exists
a true label predicate in the postcondition some steps
later.
• We proved many useful inference rules including those
for composing code blocks, such as sequencing, frame,
and strengthen, etc. For example, the LPMerge rules
combine and split label predicate entries which have the
same label (Figure 3.a. We have omitted the leading
SPEC).
• The Hoare logic has only one role in Lf : composing
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ir {P ∪ {(l, p)} ∪ {(l, q)}} C {Q} = ir {P ∪ {(l, p ⊻ q)}} C {Q}
ir {P} C {Q ∪ {(l, p)} ∪ {(l, q)}} = ir {P} C {Q ∪ {(l, p ⊻ q)}}
(a) LPMerge rules
{(0x20, MEMORY dom df ∗ 〈r2 ∈ dom〉 ∗ 〈r1 6= 0〉 ∗ S sZ z ∗ a1)}
blk4 (1)
{(0x14, MEMORY dom ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) df) ∗ a2)}
a1 = R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1, a2 = S sZ (r1 = 0) ∗ a1
{(0x20, MEMORY dom df ∗ 〈r2 ∈ dom〉 ∗ 〈r1 = 0〉 ∗ S sZ z ∗ a1)}
blk4 (2)
{(0x2C, MEMORY dom ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) df) ∗ a2)}
(b) The Hoare judgments of blk4
Fig. 3. Hoare logic rules and judgments
automated by meta-language programming. For example,
Figure 3.b gives the Hoare judgments of blk4 of Fig-
ure 1.a.3 Blk4 has two separate judgments with each for
a branch condition, and the branch conditions, 〈r1 6= 0〉
and 〈r1 = 0〉, originate from the branch instruction bne
foo, which has two separate axioms [13]. The value of
the sZ flag is set to (r1 = 0) in the postconditions (we
have omitted the assertions for other status flags).
• After composition, the assertion of a safety property is
“pushed up” to the precondition of the code block con-
taining the instruction, becoming the block’s condition,
e.g. 〈r2 ∈ dom〉 is now an assertion of the judgments
of blk4. Branch conditions are a little different, because
when we merge Judgments 1 and 2 with LPMerge rules,
the two branch conditions become tautology 〈(r1 6=
0) ∨ (r1 = 0)〉 and can be removed from the merged
judgment.
C. Well-Formed Hoare Judgments
In order to model a code block which has only one entry
address, we define a well-formed Hoare judgment as a single-
entry multi-exit Hoare judgment by imposing two constraints:
(1) there is only one entry address for the code; (2) the label of
a label predicate in the precondition must be the entry address.
Formally, it is
WF_SPEC ir P C Q iff
(SPEC ir {P} C {Q}) ∧ (∀(l, p) ∈ P. l = L(C))
where L(C) returns the entry address of a code block.
D. Hierarchical Function Judgments
The central structure of Lf is recursive function judgments.
The idea is that a function consists of code blocks and function
calls; code blocks are specified by the well-formed Hoare judg-
ment described above; we abstract a callee as a well-formed
node, which behaves like a well-formed Hoare judgment in the
caller, having a single-entry precondition, abstract code and a
3A Hoare triple is written as {P} C {Q}, and our P , C and Q are sets
which also use braces by convention. For clarity, we only use one pair of
braces in writing pre- and post-conditions and do not use braces for the code.
postcondition. We specify the relationship among these Hoare
judgments as the following: for each node, the postcondition of
its predecessor “implies” its precondition. The implication idea
comes from Floyd’s inductive assertion [3], and we formalize
it here in order to define the function judgment:
Q
P
=⇒ R iff ∀(l, p) ∈ R. ∀(k, q) ∈ Q.






It reads that a set of label predicates Q implies another set
of label predicates R (at the function level) if and only if for
every label predicate lp in R, if a label predicate kq in Q has
the same label with lp, then the singleton set of kq should
imply the singleton set of lp.
1) Function Judgments: We define the function judgment
in Figure 4.a, where wf is a well-formed node relation, and it
includes Hoare judgments of code blocks and Hoare abstrac-
tions of function calls. Figure 4.b defines such a relation. Ir
is the parameterized instruction semantics discussed before,
and prog is a set of nodes of a function, including nodes of
code blocks and nodes of callee abstractions. The definition
requires that each node is well-formed (the second to the last
line). Entry is the entry address of the function, and init is
the initial condition of the function. Exits is a set of pairs with
each pair being an exit node and its associated exit condition.
Predecessor models the CFG policy at the node level by
a function: given a node, it returns the set of predecessor
nodes. Bspec and kspec are two specifications for all nodes
of the function; the former is a mapping from nodes to their
preconditions, and the latter is a mapping from nodes to their
postconditions. The last line of the definition requires that if a
node is a predecessor of another node, then the postcondition
of the former implies the precondition of the latter. The first
line of the definition body specifies that the initial condition
of the function subsumes the bspec at the entry node, and
the second line stipulates that for every exit node, its kspec
subsumes the exit condition associated with that node. In a
simple case, {(entry, init)} is (bspec (bbl entry)), and
(kspec e) is q.
Bbl is one of the two constructors for a user-defined data
type fun_node, which represents the code of a code block
or a function by its entry label:
bbl,fun: word32 → fun_node
We use two constructors for human readability indicating that
a node is a code block or a function abstraction; from the
perspective of a type system, one constructor is enough.
2) Well-formed Nodes: The concept of a well-formed node
plays a very important role in Lf , and we define it in
Figure 4.b by using the inductive relation definition of the
meta-logic [12]. The Base rule says that the well-formed Hoare
judgment of a code block is a well-formed node. The Induction
rule says that from a function judgment (whose nodes are
well-formed), we can get a new well-formed node whose
precondition is the initial condition of the function, and whose
postcondition is the big union of its exit conditions. image
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FUN_SPEC wf ir prog entry init exits predecessor bspec kspec iff
({(entry, init)}
lp
=⇒ (bspec (bbl entry)))∧




(wf ir (bspec node) node (kspec node))∧




WF_SPEC ir {(l, p)} C {Q}
WF_NODE ir {(l, p)} (bbl l) {Q}
Base
FUN_SPEC WF_NODE ir prog entry init exits predecessor bspec kspec





PROG_SPEC ir prog entryProg predecessor bspec iff
∃kspec exits. FUN_SPEC WF_NODE ir prog entryProg (λs.T) exits predecessor bspec kspec
(c) Program judgment as the judgment of the top-level function
Fig. 4. Definitions of function judgments
returns the second element of a tuple. In the call graph of a
program, the leaf functions, which do not have a callee, only
have the bbl nodes; other functions have both bbl and fun
nodes (Figure 1.c).
Figure 4.c defines the judgment of a program, which is sim-
ply the judgment of the top-level function. We have simplified
the initial condition to (λs.T) by focusing on the predicate of
states instead of the contents of states.
3) Soundness: Our soundness proof says that a program
never gets stuck under a given semantics throughout its exe-
cution. An intuitive argument is that when control reaches the
end of a code block, it resumes on one of its successor blocks
(including jumping to the entry block of another function)
because of the implication relation. Formally, we may derive
a function specification FUN_SPEC if and only if: starting
from its initial state s, if the execution reaches the label of a
code block, L(n), then the precondition defined by bspec on
the block is ensured to be true. We have omitted the theorem
itself, since it uses some definitions of our Hoare logic which
we did not show (We will have a detailed technical report
available on-line if this paper is published).
III. AUTOMATIC VERIFICATION OF SAFETY PROPERTIES
We describe a specific application of Lf : verifying safety
properties. We present a framework that takes advantage of the
hierarchical structure of Lf and that utilizes an interprocedural
abstract interpretation to automate the verification. For the
example of Figure 1, we first make assertions about the
memory safety and the control flow integrity by defining a
safe instruction semantics SAFE_INS and use it to instantiate
the semantic parameter ir.
A. Safe Instruction Semantics
We augment an exiting instruction axiom to the following
by asserting the safety properties mentioned before:
{PC l ∗ MEMORY mem df ∗ MEMORY cm cf∗
〈ms(ins) ⊆ mem〉 ∗ 〈l′ ∈ succ(l)〉 ∗ p}
(l, ins) (3)
{PC l′ ∗ MEMORY mem df ′ ∗ MEMORY cm cf ∗ p′}
where l is the value of the PC, p represents other assertions
that are not explicitly written out, and corresponding values
in the postcondition are marked with a prime ′.
1) Safety Assertions: Recall that mem is the set of pre-
defined memory region mentioned in Section I-A, and succ
is the CFG policy. ms(ins) is the set of memory addresses that
an instruction, ins, writes to. 〈ms(ins) ⊆ mem〉 is the assertion
for memory safety, and 〈l′ ∈ succ(l)〉 is the assertion for the
control flow integrity. The memory assertion is true for non
store instructions, because ms(ins) = {}. MEMORY cm cf
asserts the data pool of ARM executables. A data pool is a set
of memory addresses in the text section for storing constants,
and our augmented theorem says that it cannot be changed
(cf ′ = cf ). The purpose of modeling the data pool is that some
constants are useful in proving some properties. Figure 5.a
shows the augmented theorem for the axiom in Figure 2.
2) The Safe Instruction Rule: We define a safe instruction
rule, whose antecedent is the augmented theorem, and whose
conclusion is a new relation SAFE_INS:
theorem 3
SAFE_INS (l, MEMORY mem df ∗ MEMORY cm cf∗
〈ms(ins) ⊆ mem〉 ∗ 〈l′ ∈ succ(l)〉 ∗ p)
(l, ins)
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{PC p ∗ MEMORY mem df ∗ MEMORY cm cf∗
〈ms(0xE5C21000) ⊆ mem〉 ∗ 〈(p+ 4) ∈ succ(p)〉 ∗ a1}
(p,0xE5C21000) // strb r1,[r2]
{PC (p+ 4) ∗ MEMORY mem ((r2 7→ (w2w r1)) df) ∗
MEMORY cm cf ∗ a1}
a1 = R 2 r2 ∗ R 1 r1
(a) The augmented semantics of strb r1, [r2]
SAFE_INS (p, 〈(p+ 4) ∈ succ(p)〉 ∗ 〈{r2} ⊆ mem〉 ∗ · · · )
(p,0xE5C21000) // strb r1,[r2]
(p + 4, · · · )
(b) Safe instruction semantics of strb r1, [r2]
Fig. 5. Safe instruction rule in action
This rule is critical, because if we directly use an instruction
semantic with safety assertions in a logic, when the safety
assertions are simplified to true and removed from the
precondition, it is not clear what causes the absence of the
assertions: that the axiom does not have the assertions at all,
or that they have been discharged. With the new relation,
SAFE_INS, we are always assured that they have been
discharged; there is no instruction without having the safety
assertions in this relation.
After applying this rule to the augmented theorem in Fig-
ure 5.a, we get the safe instruction semantics for the store
strb r1, [r2], in Figure 5.b (We have omitted the assertions for
memory, R2 and R1, since they are the same as in (a)).
It is noteworthy that this rule also provides flexibility in
proving safety properties. For example, if we want to prove a
different property, say, memory reads being confined to pre-
defined regions, then we only need to formalize it as assertions
in the augmented theorem. All the proven rules and definitions
stay unchanged.
3) Instantiating the Semantic Parameter: We use the
SAFE_INS relation to instantiate the semantic parameter ir
in Lf . This instantiation means that every instruction of a
program over all possible executions has been asserted for the
safety properties defined by the SafeIns rule. For example, the
program judgment in Section I-A has this relation, indicating
that every instruction of the program has been asserted for
memory safety and control flow integrity.
By the definition of PROG_SPEC SAFE_INS, proving it
boils down to finding the P=⇒ relation among nodes inside func-
tions, which in turn reduces to finding global invariants that
can discharge the safety assertions that the SAFE_INS relation
has. There are two processes in Lf that discharge these safety
assertions. One is the composition process (Section II-B). For
example, the assertion 〈(p+4) ∈ succ(p)〉 in Figure 5.b can
be discharged for the instruction at address 0x20 (Figure 1.a)
after we instantiate p to 0x20 in composing. For the assertions
that cannot be discharged by composition, they are pushed up
to the precondition of the Hoare judgments of code blocks, and
we use another method presented below to discharge them.
B. Interprocedural Safety Assertion Analysis
This is a backward context-sensitive and flow-sensitive
analysis. Its domain is the power set of all concrete safety
assertions occurring in the Hoare judgments of code blocks.
It runs on a function at a time and computes, for a set of
incoming safety assertions, the set of assertions that goes
out of the function. A function has two types of nodes:
block nodes: Hoare judgments of code blocks, and function
nodes: abstract nodes for function calls. The transfer function
works differently on a block node and a function node. For a
block node, it runs as follows: when a node has an incoming
safety assertion, it tries to derive the assertion from the label
predicates in the postcondition whose labels are the same
as the incoming assertion; if it succeeds, which means the
assertion is true, it does nothing; otherwise, it propagates the
assertion along the flow, hoping that other nodes can discharge
the assertion. For a function node, it suspends the computation
in the caller and “dives into” the code of the callee. It merges
the incoming assertions to the in-configuration of each exit
node of the callee and computes the outgoing assertions for the
callee. It takes the assertions going out of the callee as the new
configuration of the function node and resumes the analysis in
the caller. If the callee has other callees, it recursively dives
into these callees to compute their outgoing configurations.
In simplified pseudo-code, the transfer functions are (Σin
and Σout are the in- and out-configurations of a function):
transfer block (bnode,Σin):
foreach (l, assert) in Σin(bnode)
foreach (l′, p) ∈ postcondition(bnode)
if l′ = l and (not (p implies assert)) then
Σout(bnode) = Σout(bnode)∪{(L(bnode), assert)}
transfer fun (fnode,Σin):
merge Σin(fnode) to the in-configuration
of exit nodes of function of fnode (fun of fnode);
compute the states of fun of fnode until fixed point;
Σout(fnode) = the out-configuration of the entry
node of fun of fnode
This algorithm computes the global invariants—where a
safety assertion can be discharged—in depth first search. In
theory, it is exponential, but in practice, we use a cache
for each function that records the outgoing assertion for a
given incoming assertion. This makes an assertion traverse a
function only once, reducing the complexity to polynomial.
Our implementation also records or computes the following
information:
• The location where a safety assertion is originated in
a context-sensitive call graph and the path it traverses
through;
• the location where a safety assertion gets discharged;
• for each block node, which safety assertions traverse
along which call paths and their conversion theorems
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sponding outgoing assertions).
This information is necessary for later proof automation that
constructs function abstractions in depth first search for the
top-level function. The automation is implemented by meta-
language programming, in which we take the safety assertions
that are propagated by a block node and use the Frame rule to
add them to the node, generating a context-sensitive judgment
along a call path. The framed Hoare judgments are able
to imply the precondition of its successor nodes from their
postcondition.
IV. PROVING THE EXAMPLE
We illustrate the verification process by proving the example
in Figure 1. First, we compose Hoare judgments of code blocks
by instantiating the semantic parameter ir with SAFE_INS
and use the Frame rule to convert the local judgments to the
global version. The results are shown below. For clarity, we
have omitted the leading relation marker SPEC SAFE_INS.
In addition, we have not explicitly written out unchanged
assertions and less important assertions such as assertions of
status flags; they are represented by · · · .
{(0x0, REG rf ∗ · · · )}
blk1 (4)
{(0x14, REG rf ′ ∗ · · · )}
{(0x10, REG rf ∗ · · · )}
blk2 (5)
{(0x10, REG rf ∗ · · · )}
where REG rf collectively asserts the values of registers from R1
to R14 (similar to MEMORY), and rf ′ = ((R14 7→ 0x10) ((R0 7→
0) ((R1 7→ 0) ((R13 7→ 0x41000000) rf)))).
{(0x14, REG rf ∗ S sZ z ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x1C)〉∗
〈rf R2 6= 0x40000000〉 ∗ · · · )}
blk3 (6)
{(rf R14,REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf) ∗ s1 ∗ · · · )}
s1 = S sZ ((rf R2) = 0x40000000)
{(0x14, REG rf ∗ S sZ z ∗ 〈rf R2 = 0x40000000〉 ∗ · · · )}
blk3 (7)
{(0x20, REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf) ∗ s1 ∗ · · · )}
{(0x20, MEMORY mem df ∗ REG rf ∗ S sZ z ∗
〈{rf R2} ⊆ mem〉 ∗ 〈rf R1 6= 0x0〉 ∗ · · · )}
blk4 (8)
{(0x14, MEMORY mem ((rf R2 7→ w2w(rf R1)) df) ∗ s2 ∗ · · · )}
s2 = REG rf ∗ S sZ ((rf R1) = 0x0)
{(0x20, MEMORY mem df ∗ REG rf ∗ S sZ z ∗
〈{rf R2} ⊆ mem〉 ∗ 〈rf R1 = 0x0〉 ∗ · · · )}
blk4 (9)
{(0x2C,MEMORY mem ((rf R2 7→ w2w(rf R1)) df) ∗ s2 ∗ · · · )}
{(0x2C, REG rf ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉 ∗ · · · )}
blk5 (10)
{(rf R14,REG rf ∗ · · · )}
There are safety assertions that are not discharged dur-
ing composition: 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x1C)〉 (Judgment 6),
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉 (Judgment 10), and 〈{rf R2} ⊆
mem〉 (Judgments 8 and 9).
Next, we examine the judgments of nodes in function foo
(Judgments 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10) to see if these assertions can
be discharged. 〈{rf R2} ⊆ mem〉 can be discharged by the
postcondition of Judgment 7, because it has the branch con-
dition of 〈(rf R2) = 0x40000000〉, and ({0x40000000} ⊆
mem) = true. In order to get it formally, we frame the branch
condition to the judgment itself. As a result, the assertion in the
postcondition has 〈(rf R2) = 0x40000000〉, which implies
the memory assertion of blk4. In our framework, this work is
done by the abstract interpretation described in Section III-B.
The other two assertions cannot be discharged inside foo
and are propagated to the judgment of blk3 by the analysis.
After the analysis, we take the safety assertions propagated by
a block node and frame them to the node judgment. We also
merge the two judgments of the same block with the LPMerge
rules. For example, we get the framed and merged judgment
of blk3 in (11) (similar to blk4). The branch conditions
form tautology after merging and are removed. The merged
judgments have one entry in the precondition and two entries
in the postcondition. It is easy to prove that they are well-
formed Hoare judgments by definition (Section II-C).
{(0x14, REG rf ∗ S sZ z ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x1C)〉∗
〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉 ∗ · · · )}
blk3 (11)
{(rf R14, REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf) ∗ s1 ∗ · · · ),
(0x20, REG ((R1 7→ (rf R1− 1)) rf) ∗ s1 ∗
〈rf R2 = 0x40000000〉 ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉 ∗ · · · )}
Next, we construct the terms needed for proving the function
judgment of foo. Let Pi and Qi be the precondition and
postcondition of blki. After using the Base rule (Figure 4.b),
we get three well-formed nodes, whose code is: foo =
{bbl 0x14, bbl 0x20, bbl 0x2C}. We construct the
two specifications of the function as: foo_bspec = {(bbl
0x14) → P1, (bbl 0x20) → P2, (bbl 0x2C) → P3}, and
foo_kspec = {(bbl 0x14) → Q1, (bbl 0x20) → Q2,
(bbl 0x2C) → Q3}. The exit specification is foo_exits
= {(bbl 0x14, Q1), (bbl 0x2C, Q3) }. The initial condi-
tion has the two assertions that are not discharged by foo:
foo_init = 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x1C)〉 ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈
succ(0x2C)〉 ∗ · · · . With these terms, we are able to prove
the judgment of function foo:
FUN_SPEC WF_NODE SAFE_INS foo 0x14 foo_init
foo_exits foo_predecessor foo_bspec foo_kspec
where foo_predecessor is the predecessor relation of
nodes: {bbl 0x14 → {bbl 0x20}, bbl 0x20 → {bbl
0x14}, bbl 0x2C → {bbl 0x20}}.
By applying the Induction rule (Figure 4.b), we get the well-
formed node of function foo, whose three label predicate
entries in the postcondition come from the postconditions of
blk5 and blk3 (we only write out state predicates for clarity):
WF_NODE SAFE_INS
{(0x14, 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x1C)〉 ∗ 〈rf R14 ∈ succ(0x2C)〉)}
fun 0x14 // foo (12)
{(rf R14, · · · ), (rf R14, · · · ),
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With this Hoare judgment of foo, we repeat the above rea-
soning process for function entryFun. Inside this function,
the two assertions of foo are discharged by the postcondition
of blk1, where R14 is 0x10. As a result, we are able to
prove the PROG_SPEC judgment given in Section I-A, where
entryFun is the set of nodes of entryFun, pred is the
predecessor relation of these nodes (Figure 1.c gives the
pictorial representation of these two terms), and bspec is
the mapping from the nodes to their preconditions.
V. RELATED WORK
Boyer and Yu made the first attempt to verify small real-
world executables with symbolic execution, but their spec-
ifications and proofs were done manually [1]. Myreen et
al. developed a traditional Hoare logic for machine code
programs [14] and a decompiler to reuse proofs for multiple ar-
chitectures [15]. Both the logic and the decompilation require
structured code in order to compose a judgment or to develop
a function. Tan and Appel developed a compositional logic
for reasoning about arbitrary control flows and proved typing
rules for the foundational proof-carrying code project [22].
Their logic requires a complicated semantics and soundness
proof.
Proof-carrying code uses a VCG-based approach to verify
programs without formalizing the method itself [16].
Shao’s group developed certified assembly programming
to verify low-level code [17], [24]. It requires manually
provided specifications of code, and the verification process is
interactive. This is similar to the last step in our framework,
in which the specifications are instantiated and verified.
Seo et al. used the result of an abstract interpretation to ap-
proximately guide the construction of Hoare logic proofs [21],
but the abstract interpreter generated redundant information
that needed to be removed manually.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND CONCLUSION
We implemented Lf and the framework for verifying safety
properties in the HOL theorem prover and applied it to
automatically prove the memory safety and the control flow
integrity of rewritten ARM executables. The definition of our
logic is about 60 lines in HOL, proof scripts of useful theorems
are about 600 lines, and automating libraries are about 8000
lines including the interprocedural interpreter.
The ARM executables we proved include our test programs
and MiBench programs [9]. The proven MiBench programs
have text sections over hundreds of machine instructions, e.g.
StringSearch has 1104 machine words. These programs can
run on a development board based on the NXP LPC2129 chip,
which contains an ARM7TDMI core and targets industrial
automation.
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